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Rethinking Transboundary Ground Water




Despite more than forty years of promises to the contrary, neither Mexico nor
the United States have shown any inclination to pursue a border-wide pact to
coordinate management of the border region's transboundary ground water
resources. As a result, these critical resources-which serve as the sole or
primary source of fresh water for most border communities on both sides-are
being overexploited and polluted, leaving the local population with little re-
course. Imminently unsustainable, the situation portends a grim future for the
region.
In the absence of national governmental interests and involvement on either
side of the frontier, this article advocates an alternative approach, one that
sidesteps the respective federal authorities. It proposes that subnational entities
at the regional and local level pursue cooperation in the form of locally-specific,
cross-border arrangements. These may take the form of informal memorandum of
understanding, or more structured contracts for goods or services. Under the
unique circumstances of the Mexico-U.S. border, such arrangements are likely
more achievable and apt to create viable cross-border pacts that would be
respected by the local communities. Moreover they are more likely to achieve a
sustainable and water-secure future for the border its communities, and the
natural environment.
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The nearly 2,000 mile-long border between Mexico and the United States is
hot and dry. Few rivers cross this arid expanse. Nevertheless, despite the lack of
visible, life-sustaining water, the region is growing-the combined border
population, currently around 14.4 million, is expected to increase forty percent by
2020.1 Ground water, in the form of transboundary aquifers, makes this growth
possible. As many as twenty aquifers straddle the Mexico-U.S. border, many of
which serve as the primary or sole source of fresh water for overlying populations
and ecosystems.2
Despite the undeniable importance of the region's transboundary ground water
resources, Mexico and the United States have never penned an agreement
addressing the allocation and management of these aquifers. While various
recommendations have been proffered over the years,3 all appear to have fallen
1. GOOD NEIGHBOR ENVTL. BD., A BLUEPRINT FOR ACTiON ON THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER: THIRTEENTH REPORT
OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR ENvTL BOARD TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE U.S. 3 (June 2010) available
at http://www.epa.gov/ocem/gneb/gnebl3threport/English-GNEB-13th-Report.pdf [hereinafter GNEB 13]
(suggesting that the combined border population may grow from 14.4 million people in 2010 to around 20
million in 2020).
2. See infra note 14, 15, 19, and accompanying text.
3. For reports and journal articles recommending a comprehensive transboundary aquifers agreement
between Mexico and the United States, see e.g., Barbara G. Burman & Thomas G. Cornish, Needed: A
Ground-Water Treaty Between the United States and Mexico, 15 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 385 (1975); Stephen P.
Mumme, The U.S.-Mexican Conflict Over Transboundary Groundwaters: Some Institutional and Political
Considerations, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 505 (1980); Ann Berkley Rodgers & Albert E. Utton, The Ixtapa
Draft Agreement Relating to the Use of Transboundary Groundwaters, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1985);
Stephen P. Mumme, Apportioning Groundwater Beneath the U.S.-Mexico Border: Obstacles and Alternatives,
Research Report Series No. 45, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies (1988); Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton,
Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAr. RESOURCES J. 663 (1989); Diane M. Barber,
The Legal Dilemma of Groundwater Under the Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexican-United States
Border Area, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 639 (1992-1993); Adrienne Paule, Underground Water: A Fugitive at the
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on deaf ears. This is likely because of the disinclination of the respective federal
governments to address an issue that may be both politically sensitive and of little
diplomatic significance in the larger scheme of Mexican-U.S. relations. The
herculean effort that would be required to achieve such an accord, due to the
multitude of jurisdictions and stakeholders and the complicated nature of water
politics in the United States, gives federal officials on both sides reason for
concern.4 Additionally, compared to the issues of illegal immigration, drug
violence, economic trade, and other border and non-border issues, ground water
management ranks relatively low among the priorities of both federal govern-
ments.
As a result, the region's ground water resources are being overexploited on
both frontiers as populations and industries pump with little regard for sustainabil-
ity or transboundary consequences. 6 Moreover, these finite subsurface reservoirs
are being fouled by untreated wastes, agricultural and industrial by-products, and
other sources of pollution. Ultimately, the viability of the region's communities,
natural environment, and economic growth are threatened with stagnation and
may falter. And no one, at least on the federal level, is doing anything about it.
If both federal governments remain unwilling to take decisive steps toward
the proper and sustainable management of these vital fresh water resources,
what else can be done? Are there any alternatives to a formal, comprehensive,
border-wide regime that would address the complexity and multitude of issues
related to the various transboundary aquifers on the border?
A new approach must be identified, a new paradigm for the administration of
transboundary aquifers along the Mexico-U.S. frontier. This article proposes
such an approach, one that sidesteps the authority of the respective federal
Border, 13 PACE ENvrL. L. REV. 1129 (1996); Marilyn C. O'Leary, The Bellagio Draft Treaty as a Tool for
Solving Border Groundwater Issues, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 57, 58 (2003); Amy Hardberger, What Lies Beneath:
Determining the Necessity of International Groundwater Policy Along the United States-Mexico Border and a
Roadmap to an Agreement, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1211 (2004); Robert C. Gavrell, The Elephant Under the
Border: An Argument for a New, Comprehensive Treaty for the Transboundary Waters and Aquifers of the
United States and Mexico, 16 CoLo. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y 189 (2005); Philip Dunlap, Comment, Border
Wars: Analyzing the Dispute Over Groundwater Between Texas and Mexico, 12 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 215 (2006);
Allie Alexis Umoff, An Analysis of the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty: Its Past, Present, and Future,
32 ENVIRONS ENvTL. L. & POL'Y J. 69, 97 (2008).
Two notable exceptions are a pair of student comments, one suggesting a formal regional agreement to be
crafted between Mexico and a state or local government sharing a specific transboundary aquifer, while the
other advocates for a basin-by-basin approach to international agreements on the border. See Jennifer Evans,
Transboundary Groundwater in New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico: State and Local Legal Remedies to a
Challenge Between Cities, States, and Nations, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 471 (2006) and Robert
E. Hall, Transboundary Groundwater Management: Opportunities Under International Law for Groundwater
Management in the United States-Mexico Border Region, 21(3) ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 873 (2004).
4. See infra notes 56-80 and accompanying text.
5. See Maria Rosa Garcia-Acevedo & Helen Ingram, Conflict in the Borderlands, 38 NACLA REP. ON THE
AMERICAS 19, 24 (2004) (recognizing that "Groundwater is not highly ranked among the many issues that crowd
the bilateral agenda").
6. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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governments and places the burden of pursuing cross-border cooperation on the
local communities that so depend on these critical fresh water resources. While
this tactic challenges the two national governments' traditional monopoly over
international relations, especially as they relate to transboundary natural re-
sources, there is good reason to believe that locally-relevant, cross-border pacts
could achieve what Mexico City and Washington, DC have failed (or declined) to
do-create effective collaborative schemes for the mutual and sustainable
management of the region's transboundary ground waters.
Before presenting this new paradigm, this article considers ground water and
its use along the Mexico-U.S. border as well as the impact that population growth
and economic development have had on this fragile water resource. It then
addresses some of the challenges facing the two nations in achieving a formal
agreement over the border-region's transboundary aquifers. Following this intro-
ductory material, the article proffers a methodology for pursuing cross-border
cooperation over these shared resources on a subnational basis. This article takes
the position that a local and regional approach to transboundary aquifer adminis-
tration would be a viable and possibly preferable alternative to a formal,
border-wide treaty. By taking the initiative, through quasi-formal and informal
arrangements,7 neighboring communities on opposing sides of the frontier can
achieve sustainable management of their most critical natural resource, in spite of
the federal authorities.8
II. THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER REGION
A. A PARCHED BORDER
The boundary between Mexico and the United States stretches 1,954 miles
from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean. 9 For the most part, the region is an
arid environment ranging from semi-arid steppe along the Rio Grande in the
eastern portion of the border to dry desert in the western section.'o The Rio
Grande comprises 1,250 miles of the lengthy Mexico-U.S. border, flowing from
Ciudad Juarez-El Paso, in the Chihuahua-Texas border area, to the Gulf of
7. As used in this article, the term arrangement denotes an agreement between two or more subnational
parties on either side of the border, such as municipalities, water utilities, and ground water conservation
districts that may or may not have the force of law. See infra note 123-137 and accompanying text.
8. It is noteworthy that as far back as a quarter century ago, a U.S. Congressional commission on migration
concluded "'that a unique culture has developed [on both sides of the border], one quite distrustful of initiatives
coming from either Washington or Mexico City."' See Roberto Ham-Chande & John R. Weeks, A Demo-
graphic Perspective of the U.S.-Mexico Border, in DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS OF THE U.S.-MExico BORDER 1, 2
(1992) (quoting from REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF INT'L MIGRArION AND COOP. EcON. DEV. 90
(1990)).
9. INT'L BOUNDARY AND WATER COMM'N, Boundary Map, available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/US-Mx
Boundary_ Map.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
10. See Diana M. Liverman, et. al., Environmental Issues Along the United States-Mexico Border: Drivers of
Change and Responses of Citizens and Institutions, ANN. REv. ENERGY & ENv'T 607, 610 (1999).
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Mexico near Matamoros, Tamaulipas in Mexico and Brownsville, Texas, in the
United States. West of Ciudad Juarez-El Paso, few rivers traverse the expanse and
none in any meaningful quantity. Even the mighty Colorado River is now a
shadow of its former self, decimated by dams and diversions constructed
throughout its length in the United States and an overall decrease in precipita-
tion." Today, rainfall averages 500-750 mm along the eastern section of the
border near the Gulf of Mexico, plummets to 50-100 mm in the Sonora-Arizona
region, and increases slightly in the Baja California-California area to a still scant
100-250 mm.12 Over the next century, though, various climate models project a
more arid environment in which surface runoff in the border area will decline by
10-30%."1
Transboundary aquifers, however, underlay large segments of the frontier.
Numerous wells dot the landscape and millions of people on both side of the
border rely heavily on the region's ground water resources. The Hueco Bolson
Aquifer, for example, supplies nearly all of the fresh water used by Ciudad
Juarez's 1.5 million residents, and more than one-quarter of that used by
El Paso's 833,000 residents.14 For other border communities, these aquifers
provide the sole source of fresh water for hundreds of miles, including for the
numerous "sister cities" that bisect the border.' 5
11. Flows that once exceeded 10,000 acre-feet annually in the Colorado River's lower reaches, as measured
below all major dams and diversions near the border, are now barely recordable. See Kevin G. Wheeler, et al.,
Alternatives for Restoring the Colorado River Delta, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 917, 959 (2007). See also U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CLIMATIC FLUCTUATIONS, DROUGHT, AND FLOW IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN (Aug. 2004),
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2004/3062/pdf/fs2004-3062_version2.pdf (demonstrating that average an-
nual flows in the Colorado River, measured at Lee's Ferry [just below Lake Powell at Glen Canyon Dam in
Arizona], dropped from over 15 million acre-feet early in the 1900s to just over 5 million acre-feet in the 2000s).
12. NAT'L WATER COMM'N OF MEX., STATISTICS ON WATER IN MEXICO 27 (Jun. 2010), available at http://
www.conagua.gob.mx/CONAGUAO7/Publicaciones/Publicaciones/SGP-6-10-EAM201OIngles.pdf.
13. Id. at 177; GNEB 13, supra note 1, at 10.
14. TEX. WATER DEV. BD., FAR WEST TEXAS WATER PLAN, 1-47, 1-70, 1-71 (Jan. 2011), [hereinafter FAR WEsT
TEXAS WATER PLAN] available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/wrpilrwp/3rdRound/2011_RWP/RegionE/PDF's/
Complete_.FinalReport.pdf; Zhuping Sheng & Jeff Devere, Understanding and managing the stressed
Mexico-USA transboundary Hueco bolson aquifer in the El Paso del Norte region as a complex system,
13 HYDROGEOLOGY J. 813, 814 (2005).
15. Sister cities, also known as twin cities, are urban areas along the border that, but for the international
border, would be a single, contiguous community. See Ham-Chande & Weeks, supra note 8, at 9. The most
prominent of the border's sister cities entirely dependent on ground water include: Puerto Palomas (Chihuahua)
and Columbus (New Mexico), Naco (Sonora) and Bisbee (Arizona), Nogales (Sonora) and Nogales (Arizona),
Sonoyta (Sonora) and Lukeville (Arizona), and Tecate (Baja California) and Tecate (California). Blake Johnston
et al., Groundwater in the West Conference Reports, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 328, 335. See also TERRY W.
SPROUSE, WATER ISSUES ON THE ARIZONA-MEXICO BORDER: THE SANTA CRUZ, SAN PEDRO AND COLORADO RIVERS
4 (2005), available at http://wrrc.arizona.edu/sites/wrrc.arizona.edulfiles/Water%20Issues%20on%20the
%20Arizona%2OMexico%2OBorder.pdf; Elaine Moore Hebard, Jointly Managing a Transboundary Aquifer: A
Binational Dialogue Through Community Participation and Education, in CROSS BORDER WATERS: FRAGILE
TREASURES FOR THE 211" CENTURY 39 (1998); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (EPA), WATER SUPPLY, WASTEWATER
COLLECTION AND TREATMENT PROJECT FOR THE CITY OF NACO, SONORA, MEXICO (Sept. 18, 1997), available at
http://www.epa.gov/region9/border/infrastructure/becc/nacofea.pdf (providing an example of border waste-
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These transboundary aquifers, however, also represent a critical source
of fresh water for the border-region's distinct environment. For example, the
Mexicali Valley-Imperial Valley Aquifer, which straddles the Mexico-U.S.
border near the cities of Mexicali in Baja California and Calexico in Cali-
fornia, links hydrologically to and serves as a major source of water for the
Andrade Mesa Wetlands in Northern Mexico.' 6 The Wetlands provide a criti-
cal migratory habitat for some 100 species of birds.17 Throughout the bor-
der, water-dependent ecosystems create unique habitats for an estimated 450
species."
Despite the significance that ground water resources play in the border
region, little is known about the geographic range, volume, flow direction,
quality, and renewability of most of these underground treasures. In fact,
the location and actual number of all of the aquifers traversing the frontier
has yet to be formally determined, though counts range between eight and
twenty. 1
water infrastructure projects).
16. See Francisco Zamora Arroyo, et.al., Looking Beyond the Border: Environmental Consequences
of the All-American Canal Project in Mexico and Potential Binational Solutions, in SCERP MONOGRAPH
SERIES No. 13 THE U.S. MEXICAN BORDER ENVIRONMENT, LINING THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL: COMPETITION OR
COOPERATION FOR WATER IN THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER? 21, 28 and 29 (Vicente Sanchez Munguia ed., 2006),
available at http://www.scerp.org/pubs/monol3.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2013); see generally Osvel Hinojosa-
Huerta, et.al., Andrade Mesa Wetlands of the All-American Canal, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 899 (2002).
17. Arroyo, supra note 16, at 32, 35.
18. See Garcia-Acevedo & Ingram, supra note 5, at 20.
19. For example, the Good Neighbor Environmental Board (GNEB), an independent U.S. Presidential
advisory committee, suggested in its 2005 report that eighteen to twenty aquifers may underlie the border. See
GOOD NEIGHBOR ENvTL. BD., WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT ON THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER EIGHTH REPORTIo
THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF THE U.S. 24 (Feb. 2005) available at http://www.epa.gov/ocem/gneb/
gneb8threport/gneb8threport.pdf. In its 2010 report, however, the GNEB avoids offering any estimation on the
number of aquifers traversing the border. Rather, the report notes the existence of "several transboundary
aquifers" and asserts that a lack of adequate and accurate data has resulted in "knowledge about groundwater
resources in the border region [lagging] far behind that on surface waters." GNEB 13, supra note 1, at 10, 31.
Other studies suggest that there are as few as eight and as many as eighteen. Compare UNESCO/OAS ISARM
AMERICAS PROGRAMME-TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS OF THE AMERICAS, 2005 FINAL REPORE 2ND COORDINATION
WORKSHOP, EL PASO, TX (Nov. 10-12, 2004), available at http://www.oas.orgldsd/isarn/Documents/English/
ISARM%2OAmericas%202004-%20El%2OPaso%20Workshop%20Report.pdf (identifying eight aquifers on
the Mexico-U.S. border) with INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER RESOURCES ASSESSMENT CENTRE [hereinafter
IGRAC], TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS OF THE WORLD, map at 1 : 50 000 000 (2009), available at http://www.
un-igrac.org/dynamics/modules/SFILOI00/view.php?filld= 121 (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) (depicting ten
transboundary aquifers on the Mexico-U.S. border) and Stephen P. Mumme, Minute 242 and Beyond:
Challenges and Opportunities for Managing Transboundary Groundwater on the Mexico-U.S. Border, 40 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 341 (2000) [hereinafter Munme 2000] (referencing eighteen transboundary aquifers on the
border). The most recent assessment on transboundary aquifers globally, prepared by the International
Hydrological Programme of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, reports ten transbound-
ary aquifers on the Mexico-U.S. border. INTERNATIONALLY SHARED AQUIFER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, ATLAS OF
TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS 94 (2009), available at http://www.isarm.net/publications/324.
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B. TROUBLED WATERS
Lack of information about the region's aquifers has not prevented the border
from booming. Between 2000 and 2010, the region's population grew by 16% to
14.4 million.20 Much of this growth occurred in the fourteen sister cities that
share the border.2' With a growth rate exceeding average rates in Mexico and the
United States, population in the border region is expected to reach nearly 20
million by 2020.22 As a result, reliance on the region's transboundary aquifers
continues to grow. For example, in 2005, California, Texas, Arizona, and New
Mexico ranked first, second, seventh, and thirteenth, respectively, in fresh ground
water withdrawals nationally. 23 In Arizona and Sonora, projections show munici-
pal demand for water doubling over the next ten to twenty years. 24
Years of unfettered exploitation have left the region's aquifers physically
depleted.25 For example, between 1940 and 1999, the water table of the Hueco
Bolson aquifer, which underlies both Ciudad Juarez and El Paso, fell by as much
as 45 meters,2 6 leading some to forecast the aquifer's demise by 2025.2 While
the rate of the Hueco Bolson's depletion has slowed in recent years, 28 total
withdrawals continue to exceed both natural and artificial recharge rates.29
20. GNEB 13, supra note 1, at 3.
21. Id.; see also supra note 15 (discussing sister cities on the border).
22. See GNEB 13, supra note 1; see also JAMES GERBER, DEVELOPING THE U.S.-MEXico BORDER REGION FOR
A PROSPEROUS AND SECURE RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN AND PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ALONG THE U.S. BORDER WITH
MEXICO, THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY 6 (Mar. 27,2009), available
at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/files/documents/u.s.-mexico-border-project-binational-research-papers/LAl-
pub-BorderSecGerber-032709.pdf (charting the population growths of U.S. counties and Mexican municipios
along the entire border between 1980-2005 and showing that rates in some counties and municipios were double
the respective national rates).
23. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUNDWATER WITHDRAWALS BY WATER-USE CATEGORY, 2005, IN MILUON
GALLONS PER DAY, available at http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edulwateruse/pdf/wugw-mgd-2005.pdf (last visited
Jan. 28, 2013) (providing 2005 ground water withdrawal estimates for all fifty U.S. states). In 2012,
groundwater accounted for sixty percent of all water used in Texas. See TEX. WATER DEV. BD., WATER FOR TEXAS
2012: STATE WATER PLAN 163 (2012).
24. Liverman, supra note 10, at 611.
25. See Garcia-Acevedo & Ingram, supra note 5, at 19 (noting that "Prior to 1940, groundwater basins in
many border areas were in physical equilibrium ... Since then, water withdrawal has far exceeded recharge and
has degraded water quality").
26. Liverman, supra note 10, at 611.
27. See Bill Hume, Water in the U.S.-Mexico Border Area, 40 NAT. RESOURCEs J. 189, 191 (2000); Octavio
Chavez, Mining of Internationally Shared Aquifers: The El Paso-Juirez Case, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 237, 248
(2000).
28. Between 1995 and 2005, the water table of the Hueco Bolson aquifer in the Ciudad Juarez-El Paso region
declined by an average of only seven feet annually. See RADU BoGHIcI, TEX. WATER DEV. BD., REPoRr 379:
CHANGES IN WATER LEVELS IN TEXAS, 1995 To 2005 43 (July 2011), available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/
publications/reports/numbered reports/doc/R379_WaterLevels.pdf.
29. In 2001, total withdrawals from the Hueco Bolson aquifer exceeded 312 million cubic meters (MCM),
including 155 MCM by Ciudad Juarez and 62.2 MCM by El Paso (94.8 MCM was withdrawn by other
municipalities and entities overlying the aquifer). In comparison, natural and artificial recharge amounted to a
mere 9.6 MCM, while seepage from the Rio Grande added an additional 35.7 MCM. See Sheng & Devere,
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Similar overdrafting can be found throughout the border, including in the
Mexicali Valley where annual ground water withdrawals in the 1990s exceeded
recharge by nearly two million acre-feet.30
In addition, lack of transboundary monitoring, coordination, and management
has allowed the contamination and impairment of these critical resources.
Aquifers all along the border are being degraded by leaking septic tanks,
underground storage containers holding fuel products and other chemicals,
agricultural run-off, industrial activities, intrusion from saline aquifers, and other
pollution sources. 31 For example, in the Nogales, Sonora-Nogales, Arizona
region, topographic conditions and a lack of infrastructure on the Sonoran side
cause the majority of raw sewage and wastewater produced in Mexican colonias
to flow downhill into Nogales, Arizona.32 In Las Cruces, New Mexico, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency designated a section of the city's well field in
the transboundary Mesilla Bolson Aquifer as a Superfund site due to perchloro-
ethylene contamination.33 The source of the perchloroethylene, a volatile organic
compound, has yet to be established.34 Aquifers throughout the border region
have been polluted by both naturally occurring and industrial sources of arsenic,
as well as phosphates and nitrogen from agriculture run-off.3 5 Moreover, heavy
pumping of a number of the aquifers that traverse the border, including the Hueco
supra note 14, at 816-17; U.S. ARMY CoRPs OF ENG'R, ERDC/CERL TR-09-38, ARMY INSTALLATIONS WATER
SUSTAINABILrTY ASSESSMENT AN EVALUATION TO VULNERABILITY OF WATER SUPPLY 107 (Sept. 2009), available
at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD= ADA525795&Location=U2&doc= GetTRDoc.pdf. The re-
sult is an average decline in water storage of approximately 18.4 million gallons per day. Id.
30. See Garcia-Acevedo & Ingram, supra note 5, at 19.
31. See, e.g., Christopher Brown, Transboundary Water Resource Issues on the US-Mexico Border:
Challenges and Opportunities in the 2P1' Century, VERTIGO, Sept. 2005 at 5, available at http://vertigo.revues.org/
1883 (last visited Jan. 28, 2013); PAUL WESTERHOFF, ET.AL., PRoJ. No. W-03-19, DRINKING WATER QUALITY IN
THE US-MEXICO BORDER REGION 5-7 (2004), available at http://www.scerpfiles.org/cont-mgt/doc-files/W-03-
19-final.pdf; Suzanne Levesque & Helen Ingram, Lessons in Transboundary Resource Management from
Ambos Nogales, 2 THE ECONOMICS OF NON-MARKET GOODS AND RESOURCES 161, 168 (2003); FAR WEST TEXAS
WATER PLAN, supra note 14, at 1-47, 1-71.
32. Among other documented contaminants that have polluted area aquifers and surface waters are
ammonia, heavy metals, fecal coliform, and Cryptosporidium. See Levesque & Ingram, supra note 32, at 168.
Aquifer degradation, however, is also occurring on the U.S. side. In the U.S. state of New Mexico, between
1927 and 2000, the New Mexico Environment Department identified more than 1,400 cases of groundwater
contamination originating from a variety of point and non-point sources, including domestic septic tanks and
cesspools discharging around 94 million gallons of wastewater per day into the subsurface. See N.M. ENv'T
DEP'T, THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENTl 2001 REPORr 26 (2001); Dennis McQuillan, et.al, Ground Water: New
Mexico's Buried Treasure, N.M. ENv'T DEP'T 3 (May 2006).
33. See generally, U.S. EPA, RECORD OF DECISION, GRIGGS AND WALNUT GROUND WATER PLUME SUPERFUND
SITE (June 2007) [hereinafter EPA], available at http://www.epa.gov/region6/6sf/newmexico/griggs/
nm.griggs.rod.pdf. Perchloroethylene, also known as tetrachloroethene or tetrachloroethylene, is a chemical
commonly used in dry cleaning. U.S. EPA, CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT PERCHLOROETHYLENE, CAS. No.
127-18-4, OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND ToXICs FACT SHEET (Aug. 1994), available at http:/
www.epa.gov/chemfact/Lf perchl.txt.
34. EPA, supra note 33.
35. WESTERHOFF, supra note 31.
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Bolson, has allowed brackish water to migrate into the fresh zones of the aquifers
thereby increasing the salinity of these ground water resources.36
C. FALING TO AGREE
Presently, no comprehensive agreement exists between Mexico and the United
States on the regulation, management, allocation, or protection of the aquifers
that traverse the frontier. With one prominent exception, ground water resources
are only cursorily referenced in a few bilateral instruments 37 and little evidence
points to a more formal, comprehensive accord on the horizon.
The only formal bilateral instrument between Mexico and the United States
that directly refers to the region's transboundary aquifers is Minute 242 3 of 1973
36. FAR WEST TEXAS WATER PLAN, supra note 14, at 1-47, 1-7 1.
37. Minute 289 of 1992, of the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), addresses water
quality problems along the Mexico-U.S. border. While the majority of the Minute focuses on the Rio Grande
and Colorado rivers, Paragraph 4 refers to the Integrated Border Environmental Plan that was adopted by the
two countries in the same year. In turn, that Plan calls for the creation of a water-monitoring program and
database to observe both ground and surface water quality along the frontier. See INT'L BOUNDARY AND WATER
COMM'N, MINUTE 289: OBSERVATION OF THE QUALITY OF THE WATERS ALONG THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO
BORDER, (Nov. 13, 1992), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min289.pdf. In addition, the
Mexico-U.S. Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border
Area (better known as the La Paz Agreement) was crafted to promote cooperation for environmental protection
on the border. Although the agreement does not highlight ground water resources, it does obligate both parties to
undertake a host of obligations related to the protection of all water resources on the border from pollution,
cooperation over shared environmental issues, and coordination of efforts related to the border environment.
See Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the
Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, arts. 2, 5-6, Aug. 14, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 2916,
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/PublicationfUNTS/Volume%201352/volume-l352-I-22805-English.pdf.
Presumably, these obligations encompass the region's transboundary aquifers. Moreover, Annex H to the treaty,
relating to the discharge of hazardous substances along the inland international boundary between the two
nations, does include ground water within the definition of "environment." See Annex II to the Agreement
Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and
Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Pollution of the
Environment Along the Inland International Boundary by Discharges of Hazardous Substances, art. I(b), Jul. 18,
1985, 1990 WL 525899.
38. Carlos Marin, who served as Commissioner of the U.S. section of the IBWC from 2006-2008, asserted
that even in the context of data development, "the states are apprehensive about allowing federal government
involvement in the regulation of groundwater." See Carlos Marin, Bi-National Border Water Supply Issues from
the Perspective of the IBWC, 11 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 35, 39 (2003); Cf Stephen P. Mumme, Advancing Binational
Cooperation in Transboundary Aquifer Management on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 77, 89-90 (2005) (indicating that the "political-diplomatic reality" suggests that the U.S. section of the
IBWC is unlikely to pursue a comprehensive transboundary aquifer agreement with its Mexican counterpart
absent clear support from U.S. border state governments).
39. Agreement Confirming Minute No. 242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United
States and Mexico, 5, Aug. 30, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1968, 1973 WL 151875 [hereinafter Minute No. 242]. Minutes
are decisions or recommendations of the IBWC, which, once approved by both governments, become binding
obligations on the countries. The IBWC uses Minutes to implement its mandate and commitments. See Alberto
Szekely, How to Accommodate an Uncertain Future into Institutional Responsiveness and Planning: The Case
of Mexico and the United States, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 397, 398 (1993).
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of the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC).4 0 Although
focused primarily on salinity levels in the Colorado River, Paragraph 5 of the
Minute limits ground water withdrawals on both sides of the Sonora-Arizona
border near San Luis, Arizona to specifically enumerated withdrawal targets. In
addition, Paragraph 6 mandates consultation prior to the development by either
nation of any ground water resources along the border that could adversely
impact the other country.4 2
The IBWC developed these two provisions because of American concerns
over the southward migration of "American" ground water underneath the
frontier in the border area near San Luis, Arizona. A decade prior to authorization
of Minute 242, Mexico had installed a well field-the San Luis Mesa Well Field
-just south of the border near San Luis that, through its pumping activities,
caused ground water from the American side to flow southward under and across
the border.4 3 In order to minimize the "losses," the United States proposed these
provisions and, following implementation of Minute 242, constructed a well field
of its own on the U.S. side of the border. Thereafter, under agreement with
Mexico, the United States delivered to Mexico the water they extracted on the
U.S. side as part of its annual Colorado River water supply obligations under the
1944 Treaty."
Significantly, the two ground water provisions of Minute 242 were intended as
temporary measures "pending the conclusion ... of a comprehensive agreement
on groundwater in the border region."4 5 Following adoption of the Minute, the
American Section of the IBWC received authorization to pursue an accord with
their Mexican counterparts. While the Section produced a number of alternative
40. The IBWC is a binational commission whose current mandate was defined largely in Treaty Between the
United States of America and Mexico Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana
Rivers and of the Rio Grande, 59 STAT. 1219 (1944).
41. Minute No. 242, supra note 39, at 15.
42. Id. at$I 6.
43. Mumme 1988, supra note 3, at 4. In fact, Mexico ground water activities in the San Luis area were in
direct response to the activities of the Wellton Mohawk Irrigation District of Yuma County, Arizona, which in
1961, started pumping saline ground water into the Colorado River and charging the volume against Mexico's
allotment under the 1944 Treaty. Because Mexico could not use the Colorado's now higher salinity water for its
agricultural production, it started pumping ground water within Mexico just across the border from San Luis
and Yuma, Arizona. That, in turn, spurred concern on the American side and eventually resulted in the
development of Minute 242. Id.
44. See 59 STAT. 1219, at arts. 10-11; Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Project-Protective and
Regulatory Pumping Unit-Title 1, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION http://www.usbrgov/projects/Project.jsp?
proj.Name= CRBSCP+ -+Protective +and++ Regulatory+Pumping +Unit+ - +Title+ I (last updated Oct. 2,
2009). Under the 1944 Treaty, the U.S. is obligated to deliver an annual 1.5 million acre-feet of water in the
Colorado River at the border. See 59 STAT. 1219, at art. 10. While somewhat obscured in the explanation, one of
the chief purposes behind this formalization effort appears to have been the desire of various stakeholders on the
Colorado River to reduce the amount of water that, per the 1944 Treaty, had to be left in the Colorado River for
Mexico. By substituting the ground water pumped from the Arizona-Sonora border area for Colorado River
water, more of the Colorado River could then be used within the U.S.
45. Minute No. 242, supra note 39, at 5.
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schemes for apportionment and management of the border's transboundary
aquifers, divisions among the various stakeholders, especially on the American
side, made agreement impossible.4 6 As a result, nearly four decades later, the
temporary provisions of Minute 242 remain in place.47
III. CONSTRAINTS TO FORMAL BI-NATIONAL COOPERATION
Both Mexico and the United States readily acknowledge the importance of the
region's ground water resources and the declining condition of these aquifers.4 8
However, since implementation of Minute 242, neither nation has pursued any
significant efforts to further or formalize their transboundary ground water
relations. In fact, with few exceptions, Mexico and the United States have taken a
unilateral approach to the management of the transboundary aquifers underlying
their shared border.4 9 Essentially, both nations have permitted landowners,
companies, public entities, and others to construct wells all along the border and
to withdraw ground water, within their respective territories, in response to the
increasing needs of their individual citizens and economies. Moreover, they often
allow these activities to continue with little regard for the impact on each other,
on the border's transboundary aquifers, or on the region's environment. The
consequences have been regrettable.
46. See Robert J. McCarthy, Executive Authority, Adaptive Treaty Interpretation, and the International
Boundary and Water Commission, U.S.-Mexico, 14 U. DENv. WATER L. REV. 197,227-28 (2011) (describing the
efforts by the US-IBWC to develop a ground water agreement following adoption of Minute 242).
47. As of December 2010, both Mexico and the United States continued to be in compliance with the
pumping restrictions under Paragraph 5 of Minute 242. See EDWARD DRUSINA, INT'L BOUNDARY AND WATER
COMM'N, A REPORT ON COLORADO RIVER SALINITY OPERATIONS, UNDER INT'L BOUNDARY AND WATER COMM'N
MINUTE No. 242 6, 8, 16, 17 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/AnnualSalinity-
Report_2010.pdf.
48. In 2006, the United States Congress adopted the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Aquifers Assessment Act
in recognition of the need to systematically assess ground water resources along the border. See United
States-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-448, 120 Stat. 3328-3332 (Dec. 22,
2006), [hereinafter TBAAct], available at http://internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Local-GW-
Agreements/US-MexAquifer-Assessement-Act.pdf. To date, the program has received $2,000,000 in funding
from the fifty million dollars authorized by the U.S. Congress over its ten-year life span. See TAAP-A/S, FAcr
SHEET. U.S.-MExico TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFER ASSESSMENT PROGRAM-ARIZONA (TAAP-A/S) (Mar. 7, 2011),
available at https://wrrc.arizona.edulsites/wrrc.arizona.edulfiles/taap/pdf/factsheet.pdf.
In 2008, the Mexican government began exploring possibilities of negotiating a new clause in the 1944
Treaty, supra note 40, with the United States to address the border region's ground water resources. See Charles
Navarro, Mexican Government Considers Adding Aquifers to 1944 Water Treaty, 19 LATIN Am. DATABASE
(2008). See also GNEB 13, supra note 1, at 28-29 (recognizing the importance of ground water resources to
border communities and agriculture and identifying ground water contamination as an "immediate priority).
49. Enactment of the TBA Act, supra note 48, is but one example of American unilateralism. While the Act
obligates the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior "to develop partnerships with, and receive input
from, relevant organizations in Mexico to carry out the program," it is not authorized or funded as a bilateral
project. See TBAAct, supra note 48, at §§ 4-5. Notwithstanding, in the vast majority of cases, the U.S. has left
aquifer management and withdrawal regulation to the four U.S. border-states. See infra notes 64-80, and
accompanying text.
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Why have Mexico and the United States not entered into an agreement for
the management of their shared ground water resources? Why have they
neglected to raise the issue in formal diplomatic efforts with each other? Why has
Minute 242's laudable objective for a forthcoming "comprehensive" ground
water agreement for the border region5 0 remained unfulfilled? Some scholars
suggest a simple case of "out of sight, out of mind" whereby the hidden nature
of ground water resources results in their being ignored by politicians and the
general public."' Others offer a more nefarious explanation, suggesting that
the United States, as the hegemon in the Mexico-U.S. relationship, prefers to
maintain the status quo and manage the resource unilaterally in its own best
interests.5 2
Finally, an equally complicated, but possibly more pragmatic, perspective
submits that the domestic legal and political systems of both Mexico and the
United States, as they relate to the management of ground water resources, make
formal cooperation and coordination unwieldy and possibly unattainable.5 3 This
is especially evident in the disparate domestic laws of both nations, which quite
effectively impede the achievement of a formal bilateral treaty for the administra-
tion of aquifers traversing the border. In addition, the dearth of adequate and
compatible data and information on the region's ground water resources may
make cooperation a near-futile effort.
A. GROUND WATER LAWS ON THE BORDER
Both Mexico and the United States operate as federations of states allowing
their respective member states to enjoy substantial self-governance. The region
contains ten state governments-six Mexican54 and four U.S. 5 5-that are directly
involved in issues affecting the border. While under international law the
domestic laws of subnational governmental units cannot control international
transboundary relations, each state's laws nevertheless can have considerable
consequences on the development of cross-border interactions. To varying
50. Minute No. 242, supra note 39, at 1 6.
51. See e.g. LudwikA. Teclaff & Eileen Teclaff, Transboundary Ground Water Pollution: Survey and Trends
in Treaty Law, in INTERNAT'L GROUNDWATER L. 77, 110 (Ludwik A. Teclaff & Albert E. Utton eds., 1981).
52. See Mumme 2000, supra note 19, at 347. Building on this theme, Garcia-Acevedo and Ingram suggest
that "[t]he enormous asymmetry of power between the United States and Mexico" prevents achievement of
mutual interests and reasonable trust, conditions necessary for any agreement. Since Mexico has little leverage
against the United States, the hegemon prefers to pursue cooperation on its own terms and only when needed.
See Garcia-Acevedo & Ingram, supra note 5, at 24.
53. See Evans, supra note 3, at 479; See Gabriel E. Eckstein, Buried Treasure or Buried Hope? The Status of
Mexico-U.S. Transboundary Aquifers under International Law, 13 IW'L COMMUNTY L.R. 273, 277-284 (2011)
[hereinafter Eckstein, Buried Treasure or Buried Hope?].
54. The six Mexican border-states include: Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Le6n, and
Tamaulipas.
55. The four U.S. border-states include: California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.
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extents, the procedural and substantive regulations of subnational jurisdictions
place serious constraints on the ability of their national governments to enter into
arrangements with or make commitments to neighboring nations.
1. Water Law in Mexico
The Mexican national constitution explicitly reserves authority to regulate all
aspects of surface and ground water resources to the federal government. The
Comisi6n Nacional del Agua (better known by its acronym "CONAGUA")
exercises this authority by subjecting all water users to a regulated permitting
process. While six Mexican states border the United States, national legislation
preserves federal control and oversight over fresh water resources and provides
some standardization in water regulations across the country.
Notwithstanding federal control, the past two decades have seen legislation
and delegation assigning various administrative responsibilities for fresh water
resources management to numerous state and local institutions in a less than
systematic manner.58 Moreover, lack of competence and clarity in this decentral-
56. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution clearly establishes that "[t]he Nation has an original right of
property over the lands and waters within the boundaries of the national territory. The Nation has and will have
the right to transfer its property's domain to private individuals in order to create private property rights."
Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 27, Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.), translation available at http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/
leg/constmex/pdf/consting.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). The right of private ownership, however, is limited
by the federal government to the extent that:
The Nation shall have at all times the right to impose on private property restrictions based on public
interest considerations as well as to regulate, for the society's benefit, the full employment of
available commodities. This shall be done in order to achieve a fairer distribution wealth while
preserving it, as well as to achieve a balanced national development and improve the living standards
of both rural and urban populations.
Id. Article 27 further provides that:
Underground waters can be freely brought to the surface by technological devices and, therefore, the
owner of the land may claim them; yet under public interest considerations or whenever some other
uses of the water were affected, the Executive Branch of Federal Government will be empowered not
only to regulate such waters extraction and use but also to restrain the access to them as it can do with
respect to the rest of national waters.
Id.
57. See COMM'N ON ENvTL. COOPERATION, N. Am. ENvTL. LAw & POLICY, NORTH AMERICAN BOUNDARY AND
TRANSBOUNDARY INLAND WATER MANAGEMENT REPORT 28 (2001), available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/45/
3790_NAELP7e.pdf [hereinafter COMM'N ON ENvTL. COOPERATION] (stating that "the administration of water
resources in Mexico is still dominated by the federal government and is highly centralized"). See also generally
Ley de Aguas Nacionales, [National Water Law], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 1 de
diciembre de 1992, (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/16.pdf (last visited
Jan. 28, 2013).
58. See COMM'N ON ENvTL. COOPERATION, supra note 57, at 29-30 (discussing the decentralization and
delegation effort instituted in the early 1990s); Anita Milman & Christopher A. Scott, Beneath the surface:
intranational institutions and management of the United States-Mexico transboundary Santa Cruz aquifer,
28 ENV'T & PLANNING C: Gov'T & Por'Y 528, 541-44 (2010); Gavrell, supra note 3, at 211-12.
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ization effort has led to ambiguities in authority and overlapping jurisdiction.
For example, both CONAGUA and the Mexican Section of the IBWC maintain
jurisdiction over transboundary ground water resources located inside Mexico.
While CONAGUA holds responsibility for general water resources administra-
tion and focuses its efforts on the needs of Mexico's domestic water needs, the
Mexican Section of the IBWC is tasked with diplomatic relations related to
transboundary waters.60 As a result, Mexico's ability to manage and negotiate
over transboundary aspects of its ground water resources is contingent on the
ability of the two Mexican agencies to coordinate their efforts in light of their
disparate functions.
2. Water Law in the United States
While the Mexican system for managing fresh water resources complicates
negotiation with the United States, the scope and complexity of that system pales
in comparison to the U.S. system. The U.S. federal structure has largely devolved
the allocation and management of fresh water resources to the states. Although
federal environmental laws like the Clean Water Act61 and Safe Drinking Water
Act6 2 have taken over water quality issues from the states, the quantity allocation
and management of fresh water resources fall within the near exclusive purview
of each individual state.6 3 This authority includes the determination and distribu-
tion of water rights.M
As articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States, "[t]he history of the
relationship between the Federal Government and the States in the reclamation of
the arid lands of the Western States is both long and involved, but through it runs
the consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by
Congress."65 This deference to the states has allowed them to develop individual
state interests and priorities, which all too often conflict with those of neighbor-
ing states as well as of the federal government. Moreover, as it pertains to the four
U.S. states that border Mexico, deference has allowed implementation of four
59. See Milman & Scott, supra note 58, at 541-44.
60. See id.; see also Gavrell, supra note 3, at 212 (noting that CONAGUA "has generally neglected to
manage groundwater along the border, and this is reflected in the scarcity of protected zones and the substantial
problems regionally with overdrafts and water quality").
61. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 300f-j (2006).
63. One of the exceptions to state control over water quantity issues relates to out-of-state water exports. In
Sporhase v. Nebraska, the U.S. Supreme Court held that because water is an article of commerce, states may not
impose restrictions on the export of water unless justified on grounds of water conservation and public welfare.
458 US 941,952-57 (1982).
64. Robert H. Abrams, Secure Water Rights in Interstate Waters, in WATER LAW: TRENDs, POLICY AND
PRACTICE 330, 330 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D. Crammond eds., 1995).
65. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978).
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66disparate sets of laws for ground water management.
Texas, for example, follows the so-called "Rule of Capture," which entitles
landowners to withdraw ground water from beneath their land regardless of the
impact their pumping may have on neighboring landowners or other hydrauli-
cally related waters.6 7 Liability may only lie where extraction 1) is intended to
harm a neighboring landowner, 2) results in the waste of water, or 3) negligently
causes subsidence of neighboring properties. 68 Texas courts, however, have
interpreted the Rule of Capture liberally and have rarely found a violation of the
Rule.
In contrast to Texas, the neighboring state of New Mexico owns its ground
water on behalf of its citizens and allocates it according to the prior appropriation
doctrine.6 9 Under this system, the state considers ground water use a privilege
rather than an absolute property right. The state engineer issues permits allocat-
ing water use that are enforced in accordance with the principle of "first in time,
first in right"-in times of drought or other water scarce conditions, users with
more senior (older) permits have a right to their full allocation before those with
junior (younger) permits can enjoy their allotment. 70 Although prior appropria-
tion restricts ground water use to beneficial purposes, New Mexico courts have
interpreted broadly what uses are considered beneficial.
Arizona applies the doctrine of reasonable use to ground water management
and allocation. Under this scheme, landowners may pump underlying ground
water for reasonable uses on overlying land. The reasonableness of a particular
use is assessed based on a totality of circumstances and considers such factors
as well location, the amount of water used, the purpose of the use, the placement
of the water, and the extent to which the use may be wasteful.' Where water
is inadequate for two reasonable uses, the courts have tended to reduce the
allocations of the users on a pro rata basis. The use of ground water on
non-overlying land, however, is permitted only where it does not damage or
impair the water supply of another landowner who is making reasonable use on
land overlying the same ground water basin.7 2 Ground water withdrawal is also
constrained where it tends to diminish the flow of a surface stream appreciably
and directly.7 3 In addition, Arizona has created Groundwater Management Areas
66. See Eckstein, Buried Treasure or Buried Hope?, supra note 53, at 282-83.
67. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 827 (Tex. 2012). In the Day case, the Texas Supreme
Court concluded that a landowner has a real property interest in the underlying ground water in place, analogous
to a landowner's property interest in underlying oil and gas deposits. Id.
68. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 83 (Tex. 1999).
69. N.M. CONsT. art. XVI, § 2; State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 308 P.2d 983 (N.M. 1957).
70. N.M. STAr. ANN. § 72-12-1.1 (2012); State ex rel. Erickson, 308 P.2d at 983.
71. Bristor v. Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 236-38 (1953).
72. Neal v. Hunt, 541 P.2d 559, 565-66 (Ariz. 1975).
73. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source, 989 P.2d
739, 743 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc).
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in which a variety of additional local ground water use restrictions are imple-
mented in relation to both water needs and availability.74
Of the four U.S. states, California may have the most confounding series of
rules for ground water resources since the state employs two legal schemes-
prior appropriation and correlative rights-for managing its ground water re-
sources. Under correlative rights, landowners overlying an aquifer have an equal
right to a "fair and just proportion" of the underlying water for reasonable
beneficial uses on their overlying land. California courts have liberally inter-
preted the notions of fairness, reasonableness, and beneficial use. In times of
shortage, each correlative overlying user may use only a reasonable amount. 5 In
contrast, groundwater users who use the water on non-overlying land are
considered appropriators much like prior appropriators in New Mexico. As
between two appropriators, the rule of "first in time, first in right" applies.
Where an appropriator's use conflicts with that of an overlying user applying the
water on overlying land, the latter's rights are absolutely superior to those of the
former.
To further complicate the picture, a number of these states have created local
ground water districts with the authority to formulate and implement their own
local rules and standards. Texas, for example, has afforded such districts
regulatory authority to impose well-spacing controls, withdrawal limitations, and
other restrictions. Because the authorizing legislation has been general, there is
little standardization among the various districts' rules in the implementation of
these restrictions.
74. Kevin L. Patrick & Kelly E. Archer, A Comparison of State Groundwater Laws, 30 TULSA L.J. 123,
133-35 (1994).
75. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903) (introducing the correlative rights doctrine in
California); Kelley J. Hart, The Mojave Desert as Grounds for Change: Clarifying Property Rights in
California 's Groundwater to Make Extraction Sustainable Statewide, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvrL. L. & PoL'Y
1213, 1220(2008).
76. See Hart, supra note 75, at 1220.
77. Jason M. Miller, When Equity is Unfair-Upholding Long-Standing Principles of California Water Law
in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 32 McGEORGE L. REv. 991, 994-95 (2001); G. BRYNER AND E.
PURCELL, GROUNDWATER LAW SOURCEBOOK OF THE WESTERN UNITED STATES, NATURAL RES. LAW CTR, UNIV. OF
COLO. AT BOULDER 14 (2003).
78. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.101(a) (West 2011). See also Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, Summary
Description of GCDs (July 2010), available at http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/assets/public/permitting/watersupply/
groundwater/maps/gcd-text.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). Of the 96 confirmed ground water conservation
districts in Texas, five share a border with Mexico. Those districts are found within the county boundaries of
Brewster, Jeff Davis Kinney, Presidio, and Starr counties. See also Map: Groundwater Conservation Districts,
Texas Water Development Board (September 2010), available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/mapping/doc/maps/
gcd-only_8x l l.pdf (last updated Jan. 2013).
Due to a recent Texas Supreme Court decision concluding that Texas landowners have a property right in
their groundwater, governmental restraints on withdrawals could result in a constitutionally unlawful taking of
private property. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831-32 (Tex. 2012). The decision will
likely strengthen the ground water rights of individual private landowners at the expense of Texas ground water
districts, as well as the interests of the state and the general public.
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The multitude of state and local authorities involved in regulating ground
water resources in the United States has severely constrained the ability of the
federal government to present a unified American national position on the
management of transboundary ground water resources along the Mexico-U.S.
border. 79 Any negotiation undertaken by the United States must take into account
the multiplicity of interests, stakeholders, policies, and laws of the various
political subunits and, most likely, include representatives of those subunits in
deliberations. As lamented by the Good Neighbor Environmental Board (GNEB),
albeit in a politically understated tone, "Coordination on shared aquifers is
difficult because groundwater is controlled by state governments in the United
States and the federal government in Mexico."80
B. THE DATA GAP
As noted above, there exists an acute deficiency in the availability of reliable,
relevant, and congruent information on the various ground water resources
traversing the Mexico-U.S. border.8 ' While some of the aquifers have been
studied and characterized-most famously the Hueco Bolson underlying Ciudad
Juarez and El Paso82-the extent of information about the region's remaining
aquifers is scant and dispersed. 8 3 The absence of relevant and accurate informa-
tion severely constrains the ability of managers and decision-makers to formulate
strategies and policies for the sustainable management of the region's aquifers,
protect or mitigate against deleterious consequences that might result from their
use, and negotiate with relevant stakeholders, on both sides of the border, to
79. See Hume, supra note 28 at 190 (2000) (noting that the interests of the individual border states, as well as
those of political subunits and individual users, may conflict with those of the federal government); see also
COMM'N ON ENvTL. COOPERATION, supra note 59, at 141 (noting that "[c]urrently, there is no institutional
mechanism for coordinating the disparate national, state and local interests in matters involving domestic
transboundary waters").
80. GNEB 13, supra note 1, at 31.
81. See e.g., The World Bank, Rep. No. 15435-ME, Staff Appraisal Report: Mexico Water Resources
Management Program 12, Annex. C, tbl. C-3 (May 31, 1996), available at http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsarg/il
fulltext/staff/staff.pdf (noting deficiencies in adequate monitoring systems, lack of quantitative studies and
mathematical models for numerous aquifers, absence of a repository or processing system for ground water data
and information, and other deficits). See also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
Information relevant to the development of a sound understanding of each transboundary aquifer includes
data, inter alia, on each aquifer's geographic range, volume, flow, chemistry, recharge, functioning, and
dependent ecosystems. See G.A. Res. 63/124, art. 8, I1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/124 (15 January 2009)
[hereinafter Res. 63/124] (mandating exchange of information "of a geological, hydrogeological, hydrological,
meteorological and ecological nature and related to the hydrochemistry of the aquifer or aquifer system, as well
as related forecasts").
82. See e.g., INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N, TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS AND BINATIONAL GROUND
WATER DATABASE FOR THE CITY OF EL PASO/CIUDAD JUAREz AREA (1998), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/
WaterData/binational waters.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) [hereinafter TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS].
83. Cf. COMM'N ON ENvTL. COOPERATION, supra note 58, at 141 (lamenting the overall lack of information on
and assessment of ground water resources in the United States).
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coordinate such efforts.
Moreover, and equally as important, there remains a lack of coordination in
the generation of data and information. Unfortunately, many of the studies pre-
pared to date have been conducted independently on either side of the frontier,
use disparate scientific standards, collect dissimilar data, and generate maps and
conceptual models that "end" at the border. As described by the GNEB,
researchers and water managers
"often are faced with the 'blank map' syndrome in which a transboundary
aquifer is mapped by an entity in the United States but, because the U.S. re-
searcher lacks access to Mexican data, the portion of the aquifer south of the
border shows up completely blank on the map (the same problem occurs north
of the border for the Mexican researcher)."8
In addition, Mexico and the United States have yet to formulate a consensus on
methodologies, techniques, procedures, assumptions, and technologies-collec-
tively known as metadatan-to use in the generation and processing of data and
information.88 This lack of consensus also poses a significant barrier to coop-
eration because incompatible data generated on different segments of an aquifer
may be useless for establishing baseline aquifer characteristics or monitoring and
assessing subsequent changes." At the very least, this hampers the ability of
decision-makers to fully project and plan for future needs and uses, as well as to
protect against potential harms; at worst, this thwarts decision-makers' efforts.
IV. TRANSBOUNDARY GROUND WATER COOPERATION ON THE
MEXICO-U.S. BORDER: THE WAY FORWARD
Scholars and other professionals have long championed pursuit of a for-
mal bilateral treaty to manage the transboundary aquifers on the Mexico-U.S.
84. See Gabriel Eckstein, Commentary on the U.N. International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the
Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L L. & PoL'Y 537, 578-79 (2007) [hereinafter Eckstein,
Commentary].
85. Sheng & Devere, supra note 14, at 818-819.
86. GNEB 13, supra note 1, at 31.
87. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), "[m]etadata consists of information that characterizes
data. Metadata are used to provide documentation for data products. In essence, metadata answer who, what,
when, where, why, and how about every facet of the data that are being documented." U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY, http://geology.usgs.gov/tools/metadata/tools/doc/faq.html#q1.1 (emphasis in original) (last updated
Dec. 11, 2012).
88. Scientists often have available to them multiple approaches or instrumentations to assess a particular
aquifer characteristic, such as rate of flow, hydraulic potential, or chemical composition. Different approaches,
however, can produce disparate results because of the multitude of factors and assumptions that go into the
analytical process of each approach. Moreover, due to variations in education, training, experience, and
preferences, the professionals employed to conduct studies and produce data on a transboundary aquifer will
often use different methodologies and procedures and may focus on different aquifer characteristics. Eckstein,
Commentary, supra note 84, at 581-82.
89. Eckstein, Commentary, supra note 84, at 581-82.
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frontier.90 Given the numerous obstacles discussed herein, the likelihood of such
a border-wide agreement is close to nil. Nevertheless, given the threat posed by
diminishing ground water resources to the viability of the region's communities,
natural environment, and economic growth, inaction is a recipe for disaster.
Something must be done.
In order to surmount the numerous impediments obstructing a border-wide
agreement, a new approach is needed-a new paradigm for administering
transboundary ground water resources along the Mexico-U.S. border. In a prior
study, the present author and a colleague identified an interesting phenomenon
whereby subnational governmental units had sidestepped their federal counter-
parts and pursued cross-border cooperation on regional and local levels.91 While
not ubiquitous, these occurrences are noteworthy, especially to the extent that the
arrangements provide examples of practical and seemingly successful processes
for cooperation across international frontiers. Although the success of these
arrangements is difficult to assess and the status of some of these arrangements
may be legally indefensible,9 2 empowering local institutions and communities to
formulate locally-relevant, hydrologically appropriate, cross-border pacts pos-
sesses many positive traits.
A. BY LOCALS, FOR LOCALS
The degree of interest that the national authorities have in a local issue is often
directly proportional to the physical distance from the capitol. In fact, priorities
in specific areas of the border often conflict with those of the rest of the nation or
of those espoused by the national legislature or executive office.9 3 Hence, a
disconnect often exists between knowledge and potential consequences when
national officials address, or even neglect, a transboundary issue with regional or
local significance.
While it focused on the European context, a report from 1973 on overcoming
barriers to cooperation by local and regional authorities rightly noted the
handicaps faced by local authorities in frontier areas as compared to their more
centrally located counterparts. These problems typically arise because they are:
a) geographically far from regional or national centers, b) reliant on their foreign
90. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
91. See Gabriel Eckstein & Amy Hardberger, State Practice in the Management and Allocation of
Transboundary Groundwater Resources in North America, 18 YEARBOOK OF INT'L ENVTL. L. 96 (2008).
92. See infra notes 123-129, and accompanying text.
93. One of the clearest examples in the United States in which local opinion's often diverged from those of
elected national representatives is in the area of immigration. For example, while many in the U.S. Congress
have long championed construction of a fence along the Mexico-U.S. border as a means of preventing illegal
immigration, numerous border communities vehemently oppose such projects. See, e.g., Texas Mayors Oppose
Plan for Border Fence, NAT'L Pus. RADIO (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld= 15315131; Texas cities oppose borderfence, THE WASH. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, http://www.washington
times.com/news/2008/feb/2 1/texas-cities-oppose-border-fence/?page =all.
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neighbors for much of their commerce and trading, and c) have to work with
authorities that, while only a short distance away, are located across an interna-
tional political boundary. 9 4 The same situations and disadvantages are present
today on the Mexico-U.S. border.
Efforts to achieve a thoughtful, environmentally-sound, and equitable manage-
ment and allocation regime for a particular transboundary aquifer are more likely
to succeed if they involve and are driven by local stakeholders and decision-
makers.9 5 While it may be true that local institutions and communities do not
always have the resources or technical knowledge to address broad and scientifi-
cally complex cross-border challenges, this does not mean that they do not have
the capacity to adopt and implement sound policies and arrangements based upon
relevant studies and information obtained from higher-level governmental agen-
cies or other sources.96 In fact, local decision-makers are typically better
informed about local and regional cross-border concerns than federal bureau-
crats, especially on issues related to the management of area fresh water
resources, and therefore are more likely to achieve an accord. Moreover, local
authorities are better able to reflect the values and preferences of those most
likely to be affected by an accord with a neighboring country, which, for a local
border community, is merely a short drive away.9 8
In addition, local decision-making would likely be more responsive and
adaptable to changing circumstances and improved knowledge. Climate change,
for example, threatens the border region in ways that have yet to be fully
ascertained. While studies generally forecast more arid conditions and reduced
rainfall and stream flow throughout the Mexico-U.S. border area in coming
decades, much debate and speculation remains as to how, where, and to what
extent those changes will occur. Moreover, and more to the point, impacts will
likely vary all along the frontier, affecting different regions in disparate ways. 99
94. PAUL ORIANNE, DtmculIEs IN COOPERATION BETWEEN AUTHORITIES AND WAYS OF SOLVING THEM, LOCAL
AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES IN EUROPE STUDY No. 6, COUNCIL OF EUROPE 4 (1973).
95. James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation More Adaptive Through Decentralization: The
Case For Subsidiarity, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1377-78, 1381-1382 (2004). In the European context, the emphasis
on local decision-making is known as subsidiarity, a legal norm that obligates decision-making to be
implemented at the lowest level of competent authority. See R.K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of
Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REv. 103, 142 (2001); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a
Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 42 (2003).
96. See Huffman, supra note 95, at 1395.
97. See Patrick Forest, Transferring bulk water between Canada and the United States: More than a century
of transboundary inter-local water supplies, 43 GEOFORUM 14, 17 (2012) (asserting that "[f] or these com-
munities, water was more than just a symbol of cooperation; it was vital to their survival and economic
well-being").
98. Id. at 16 (discussing the "bottom-up process based on local knowledge and understanding" that was used
to achieve numerous local, cross-border water arrangements along the Canada-U.S. border).
99. See generally GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE US, A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE REPORT FROM THE
US GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM 43-45 (Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melillo & Thomas C. Peterson, eds.,
2009), available at http://www.globalchange.gov/what-we-do/assessment/previous-assessments/global-climate-
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While comprehensive, border-wide responses to climate variability may be
suitable for certain aquifers and regions, local communities could be far more
agile in formulating local responses and solutions to their unique circumstances
as climatic and related changes become apparent.
Furthermore, the efficacy of local participation and decision-making is bol-
stered by the conviction that communities and citizens are best served by
decisions made by those with the greatest stake in the subject matter and who
would be most directly affected by possible outcomes. 00 Local border communi-
ties and their representatives typically have strong ties to individuals and groups
on the other side of the frontier in the form of friendships, family relations,
colleagues, and business connections. For decades, these communities have
developed diverse and intense networks for collaborating on a wide variety of
social (weddings and festivals), economic (trade and investment), public health
and safety (fighting fires and criminal activity), academic (conferences and
researcher collaborations), sporting (tournament and infrastructure), and other
interests.1o' These bonds allow local individuals and groups to be flexible and
adaptable to, as well as accepting of, unique local practices and changing
conditions that national officials may not recognize or appreciate in the context of
a negotiation. Moreover, locals have an especially strong incentive to seek out
long-term solutions for cross-border challenges that are both practical and
sustainable since they will have to live with the consequences of these deci-
sions.10 2
In areas like the Mexico-U.S. frontier, where transboundary aquifers are the
lifeblood of nearly every border village and population, discussions and decisions
change-impacts-in-the-us-2009 (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) (providing maps showing increasing and decreasing
trends, throughout the United States, in droughts between 1958-2007, variations in the number of days with
heavy precipitation between 1958-2007, projected changes in annual runoff for 2041-2060); Victor O. Magafia
and Cecilia Conde, Climate Variability and Climate Change, and their Impacts on Freshwater Resources in the
Border Region: A Case Study for Sonora, Mexico, in CLIMATE AND WATER: TRANSBOUNDARY CHALLENGES IN THE
AMERICAS 373 (Henry F Diaz & Barbara J. Morehouse eds., 2003).
100. See Huffman, supra note 95, at 1378, 1381-1382 (recognizing that "[t]he principle of subsidiarity thus
reflects a presumption in favor of decentralization but does not insist that centralization if never appropriate").
101. See HELEN INGRAM, ET AL., DIVIDED WATERS: BRIDGING THE U.S.-MExIco BORDER 46-47 (1995)
(discussing the border culture and the shared "we" feeling that marks border populations on the Mexico-U.S.
border, as well as the informal cross-border networks that border residents create to deal with individual and
community issues); Cf Patrick Forest, Inter-local water agreements: law, geography, and NAFTA, 51 LES
CAHIERS DE DROIT 749, 753-54 (2010) (discussing the close local relations on the Canada-U.S. border that have
led to the development of locally-arranged transboundary freshwater transfers).
102. Cf Maria Carmen Lemos & Arun Agrawal, Environmental Governance, 31 ANN. REV. OF ENv'T &
RESOURCE. 297, 303 (2006) (asserting that decentralization of environmental governance "can produce greater
efficiencies because of competition among subnational units; it can bring decision making closer to those
affected by governance, thereby promoting higher participation and accountability; and finally, it can help
decision makers take advantage of more precise time- and place-specific knowledge about natural resources");
Emma Spenner Norman & Jean 0. Melious, Hidden Waters: The Role of Local Communities in Transboundary
Environmental Management Across the Forty-Ninth Parallel, in TRANSBOUNDARY POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE
PACIFIC BORDER REGIONS OF NORTH AMERICA 195, 202, 207, 212-13 (J. Loucky, et al., eds. 2008).
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over the management of these resources are critically consequential for every
citizen. Nevertheless, while the border physically divides many of the sister
communities, residents on both sides often perceive themselves as one large
community, providing a fertile opportunity for local, cross-border cooperation.' 03
This local, "bottom-up" approach to ground water management, however, is
not intended as a broad panacea for every transboundary aquifer scenario and
may not be appropriate in all circumstances. Factors and characteristics, such as
the geographic scale of a cross-border aquifer, may dictate the level of adminis-
trative authority necessary to respond to particular issues and challenges posed.' 0
Hence, for example, where an aquifer or aquifer basin extends over a limited
region, local participation and decision-making may suffice. However, where the
specific water challenge involves an aquifer or aquifer basin that transects or
impacts a much larger area-for example, an aquifer hydraulically linked to a
large domestic or transboundary river like the Rio Grande-a strictly local
arrangement may be less suitable or effective. Decision-making ought to be
handled by the lowest level of administrative authority with competence over the
resource and its implications.105
Along the Mexico-U.S. border, some evidence shows that a local approach to
the management of the region's transboundary waters is already underway. One
notable example is the 1999 Memorandum of Understanding between the
Municipal Water and Sanitation Board of the City of Juirez (in Chihuahua,
Mexico) and the El Paso Water Utilities Public Service Board of the City of El
Paso (in Texas, US) (MoU).1 0 6 Although legally unofficial and unenforceable,10 7
103. "Boundary cities have become so functionally intertwined that their futures are inextricably bound,
whether the two national governments are able to or unable to devise formal procedures for addressing border
related problems." LAWRENCE HERZOG, WHERE NofrH MEETS SoUTH: CrTIEs, SPACE, AND POLITICS ON THE
U.S.-MEXIco BORDER 90 (1990). The sister cities of Ciudad Juarez (Chihuahua) and El Paso (Texas) have been
described as having been "isolated from the rest of their respective countries and have depended greatly upon
each other for social and economic activities." Ham-Chande & Weeks, supra note 8, at 11. Nuevo Laredo
(Tamaulipas) and Laredo (Texas) are likewise inextricably bound because of their shared history. Nuevo Laredo
was founded by former Laredo residents whose allegiances to Mexico pulled them across the Rio Grande
following demarcation of the river as the official boundary between the two nations. "Because of this history,
the ancestry and present family relationships across the bridge are very strong . . ." Id.
104. See id. at 1381 (asserting that "Only where the lower bodies prove ineffective should the federal
government become involved").
105. See Vischer, supra note 95, at 142; Carozza, supra note 95, at 42. In some cases, multiple communities
may overlay the aquifer on both sides of the border, in which case there may not be an established administrative
authority at the most appropriate governance level. In such circumstances, it may be prudent for the
communities on each side to band together to form an appropriate authority.
106. Memorandum of Understanding between City of Judrez, Mexico Utilities and the El Paso Water
Utilities Public Services Board (PSP) of the City of El Paso, Texas (Dec. 6, 1999) [hereinafter MoU], available
at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Local-GW-Agreements/El-Paso-Juarez
MoU.pdf.
107. Subnational transboundary arrangements cannot create binding obligations for their parent nations
because they do not have the imprimatur of the respective national governments. In practical terms, though,
these unofficial pacts can have profound implications for the development of customary international law, at the
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the MoU evidences the interests of governmental authorities on both sides of the
international boundary, at the very local, sub-city level, to cooperate over and
exchange information about a regionally-specific shared aquifer. Focusing on the
Hueco Bolson Aquifer underlying the two cities and the hydraulically-linked Rio
Grande, the two boards endorsed the MoU to "identify the mechanisms between
the parties to increase communications, cooperation, and implementation of
transboundary projects of common interest." 0 8
Anecdotal evidence indicates that similar, albeit even less formal or publi-
cized, cooperative arrangements over fresh water resources have been forged
elsewhere along the border. For example, in 2002, a serious drought along the
Arizona-Sonora border greatly depleted the region's aquifers and dried up
numerous wells on both sides of the frontier. While communities all along the
border suffered from this predicament, Mexican communities were especially
hard-hit due to inadequate infrastructure and planning. As a means of assisting
their parched brethren across the border, Nogales, Arizona agreed to temporarily
deliver water to their sister city of Nogales, Sonora. A fire hose attached to a
metered hydrant in Nogales, Arizona was draped across the border fence where
Mexican tanker trucks filled up their tanks and then delivered water throughout
Nogales, Sonora.1 09 Apparently, this was not the first time that a temporary water
transfer of this type had occurred." 0 While only a temporary measure, it serves as
an example of local decision-makers taking responsibility for locally-specific,
transboundary water issues and achieving locally-relevant solutions.
In one other fascinating example of a subnational cross-border water arrange-
ment, a number of Nogales, Sonora businesses and private residences have, for
the past half-century, obtained their water from the public water authority of
Nogales, Arizona."' Located near the border, each of the water users receives its
very least, as between the nations whose subnational entities entered into the arrangement. See generally
Eckstein & Hardberger, supra note 91 at 97-98, 123-24 (noting that the existence of subnational transboundary
aquifer arrangements in North America may be evidence of emerging state practice for purposes of identifying
customary international norms).
108. MoU, supra note 106, at 3. The general objectives of the MoU include, inter alia: sharing data and
information on historical and current withdrawals, sources of water, and water quality, as well as population
growth, economic development and planning; sharing technical support and information; exchanging informa-
tion on funding sources and mechanisms; coordinating efforts to secure water supplies and extend the life of the
Hueco Bolson aquifer; examining issues related to rehabilitating existing infrastructure, improving wastewater
treatment systems, and examining reuse opportunities; and developing a joint outreach program for the efficient
use and re-use of water resources on both sides of the border. Id. at 3-4.
109. See Tim Steller, Help From a Hose: Nogales, Ariz., is selling water to dry Nogales, Sonora, ARIz. DAILY
STAR (July 10, 2002). Under the arrangement, the city of Nogales, Sonora paid Nogales, Arizona the standard
rate of $1.80 per 1,000 gallons.
110. See INGRAM, supra note 101, at 78 (describing the same scenario, during a prolonged regional drought in
1989, in which water was delivered to Mexican tanker trucks across the international boundary for three months
via a pipe connected to a metered fire hydrant on the Arizona side).
111. Id. at 77-78; VIOLETA MENDOZA, N. AM. CTR. FOR TRANSBORDER STUDIES, ARIZ. ST. UNIv., INFORMAL
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER AGREEMENTS: U.S.-MExico BORDER 25 (2012).
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water from a separate water main crossing the boundary. These connections have
operated for decades, though their origins are unknown. The best known among
the Mexican businesses is the Hotel Fray Marcos de Niza, which has received
water deliveries since at least the 1940s.'l 2 While the water in the pipe has always
flowed from Arizona to Sonora, sometime in the 1990s the public water authority
of Nogales, Arizona installed a backflow preventer on the pipe leading to the
hotel to prevent the possibility that water originating on the Mexican side might
backflow to the American side.1 13
B. HYDRO LOGIC
No two aquifers are alike.' 14 Each aquifer is a complex and unique hydrologi-
cal system.' 15 Moreover, no two aquifers are perceived equally by overlaying
communities, especially where those communities are highly dependent on
aquifer resources to meet their daily freshwater needs.1 6 Hence, aquifers
traversing the Mexico-U.S. border cannot be managed effectively through a
single treaty. While a comprehensive scheme for the administration of these
aquifers may be convenient, such an approach would likely be inadequate, could
112. INGRAM, supra note 101, at 75-76; Telephone Interview with Placido dos Santos, formerly with the
Arizona Water Institute, Arizona Department of Water Resources, and Arizona Department of Environmental
Quality, (August 25, 2011) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter dos Santos interview].
113. dos Santos interview, supra note 112.
114. Cf. Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground Water
Resources and International Law, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 201, 235-48 (2003) (identifying six disparate models
of aquifers with transboundary implications).
115. The complexity of an aquifer is the product of multiple characteristics and functions that encompass the
rock formation that forms the matrix of the aquifer as well as the water contained within the saturated portion of
that formation. Each aquifer is also distinguishable by the unique qualities that characterize it, such as
hydrostatic pressure, hydraulic conductivity, confining characteristics, and the mineralogical, biological, and
chemical attributes of the aquifer. Furthermore, each aquifer has discrete functional attributes that are directly
related to the unique characteristics that make up the aquifer. Hence, every aquifer operates in unique natural
ways that include, inter alia, storing and transporting water, diluting wastes and other contaminants, providing
habitats for aquatic biota, and serving as sources of fresh water and nutrients to aquifer-dependent ecosystems.
Some aquifers even provide geothermal heat, while others have the potential for storing wastes and sequestering
carbon. See generally, RALPH C. HEATH, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, BASic GROUND-WATER HYDROLOGY, WATER
SUPPLY PAPER 2220, 14-15 (1983), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/wsp/2220/report.pdf (last visited Jan. 28,
2013). In addition, the complexity of each aquifer also includes the natural recharge and discharge zones of the
aquifer since these zones help to regulate the flow and water quality of water moving into and out of the aquifer
and, thereby, the functioning of the aquifer itself. Industrial, agricultural, and municipal development projects
undertaken in either of these zones can affect the volume and quality of water percolating into and out of an
aquifer. This is true regardless of whether or not these activities are related to the use or management of the
aquifer itself. Eckstein, Commentary, supra note 84, at 585.
116. Transboundary ground water resources are often defined in relation to the idiosyncrasies of local and
regional communities, as well as the natural environment, that rely on those resources. Hence, distinctive social,
developmental, cultural, or other characteristics, as well as unique environment features like springs and
wetlands, can have a profound impact on how an aquifer is perceived and described by overlying communities.
See, e.g., Hector M. Arias, International Groundwaters: The Upper San Pedro River Basin Case 40 NAT.
REsoURcEs J. 199 (2000).
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only offer very general guidelines and standards, and may prove detrimental to
the sustainable management of some of the region's underground water re-
sources. Rather, an effective, sound, and equitable management plan should be
tailored to each transboundary aquifer's unique characteristics and circum-
stances. 117
The Mimbres Basin Aquifer, for example, which underlies the border-states of
New Mexico in the United States and Chihuahua in Mexico, is part of a closed or
terminal drainage basin.118 This uncommon topography means that the catch-
ment has no natural drainage and that water in the basin can only exit through
evaporation or human use.1 19 Situated at the low-point of the closed basin,
recharge of the aquifer highly depends upon precipitation and what little water
trickles down the Minibres River. 12 0 Discharge from the aquifer consists predomi-
nantly of agriculture-related pumping activities. 1 2 1
In contrast, the Rio Grande Aquifer, which follows and underlies much of
the upper Rio Grande and traverses the Mexico-U.S. border in the greater El
117. See Hall, supra note 3, at 877 (contending that "[wihile a single mechanism for arriving at a
comprehensive solution may not be appropriate, there is reason to be optimistic regarding the achievement of
basin-by-basin or case-by-case international agreements on groundwater management that respond better to the
diversity of institutional, legal, social, geo-physical, and hydrologic characteristics of each basin"); Evans,
supra note 3, at 480 (citing to Mumme 2000, supra note 19, at 344 for the proposition that "With '[eighteen]
different problems areas scattered across eight geographic zones' it is evident why a case-by-case approach
might be necessary").
To some extent, an aquifer-by-aquifer approach may be comparable to the basin approach that has long been
championed for surface freshwater resources. See e.g., Gabriel Eckstein, Water Scarcity, Conflict, and Security
in a Climate Change World: Challenges and Opportunities for International Law and Policy, 27 Wis. INT'L L.J.
409, 437-441 (2010) (discussing the need for a basin approach in the context of climate change adaptation).
The approach is endorsed by such entities as The World Bank and the European Union. See, The World Bank,
Water Resources Management, 10-11 (Sept. 1993) available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/02/23/000178830_98101911251888/Rendered/PDF/multi-page.pdf (dis-
cussing a need for a comprehensive analysis at the river basin level); Council Directive 2000/EC/60, Oct. 23,
2000,2000 O.J. (L 327/1) (EC), available at http://eurlex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?ui=OJ:L:2000:
327:0001:0072:EN:PDF; and DG Environment, European Commission, Water Note 1-Joining Forces for
Europe's Shared Waters (Mar. 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eulenvironment/water/water-framework/pdf/
water.notel-joining-forces.pdf. Critical differences, however, exist that relate to the degree (and dearth) of
knowledge available on the numerous transboundary aquifers found around the world as well as the extent of
dissimilarities evident among the various types and characteristics of these resources. Certainly, it may be
possible to formulate generalities and broad, non-specific management objectives for transboundary aquifers.
Nevertheless, each transboundary aquifer necessitates a tailored approach that reflects the uniqueness of that
particular water body.
118. See John W. Hawley, et. al., Trans-International Boundary Aquifers in Southwest New Mexico, N.M.
WATER RESOURCES RES. INsT. 30 (Mar. 2000), available at http://wrri.nmsu.edulpublish/otherrpt/swnm/pdfl
downl.html.
119. See A closed or terminal basin is known in the technical literature as an endorheic watershed. See U.N.
ENV'T PROGRAMME, Div. OF TECH., INDUSTRY, & EcON. THE WATERSHED: WATER FROM THE MOUNTAINS INTO THE
SEA, available at http://www.unep.or.jp/ietc/publications/short series/lakereservoirs-2/index.asp (last visited
Jan. 26, 2013).
120. See Elaine M. Hebard, A Focus on a Binational Watershed with a View Toward Fostering a Cross-
Border Dialogue, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 281, 303-308 (2000).
121. See Hawley, supra, note 118 at 36-38.
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Paso-Ciudad Juarez area, recharges primarily from the application of surface
water to irrigable crops and to a lesser extent by direct seepage from canal and
river channels. Additionally, the Rio Grande Aquifer discharges into the adjacent
Hueco Bolson Aquifer and the Rio Grande, as well as through numerous wells
pumping its groundwater for irrigation. 12 2
While agricultural withdrawals are common sources of discharge for both the
Mimbres Basin and Rio Grande aquifers, the differences in additional discharge
mechanisms, sources of recharge, topographical features, hydrological and
geomorphological framework, and other factors are extremely consequential. To
attempt to formulate a common management approach for these two highly
dissimilar water resources, or most other transboundary aquifers, would be an
exercise in futility. Each of these transboundary aquifers necessitates a tailored
approach that reflects the uniqueness of each particular water body.
C. LEGAL, EFFECTIVE, OR BOTH?
One concern often raised with a local approach to the management of
transboundary natural resources is the legality of such action. As is true under
most nations' constitutions, both the Mexican1 23 and the U.S. 12 4 instruments
recognize the national government as the sole authority empowered to deal with
foreign representatives; they prohibit states, cities, and other subnational political
units from entering into treaties and other formal relations with counterparts
across the border. 1 2 5
However, numerous American state and local governments have engaged in
a variety of international relations ranging from cultural exchangesl 2 6 to inter-
national trade and investment1 2 7 to takings stands on international affairs. 12 8
Moreover, some evidence suggests that the federal U.S. government tolerates
independent state and local government involvement in foreign affairs and even
defers to the states with respect to certain responsibilities imposed under various
122. TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS, supra note 82.
123. See Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 117, Diario Oficial
de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.), translation available at http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/
infjur/leg/constmex/pdf/consting.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) (providing in subsection I. that "No State shall
Enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation either with other State or with foreign nations").
124. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (providing that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ...
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power").
125. See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821,
823-24 (1989).
126. Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies, 65 FOREIGN POt'Y 154, 157-58
(1986-87); Evans, supra note 3, at 493.
127. See Curtis A. Bradley, Symposium Overview: A New American Foreign Affairs Low?, 70 U. COLO. L.
Rav. 1089, 1097 (1999); Evans, supra note 3, at 493.
128. See Shuman, supra note 126, at 160-61 (discussing the political stance and policies that many American
cities took in response to South Africa's Apartheid).
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international treaties.
1 2 9
More to the point, concern over the legality or illegality of a local approach to
transboundary aquifer relations may be unwarranted. This article does not
counsel the creation of multiple, locally-specific, formal treaties all along the
border (albeit, this could be an attractive route to follow at some point in the
future). Rather, it proposes the development and implementation of locally-
specific arrangements that could be as informal as a "Memorandum of Under-
standing," 13 0 or a more structured contract for goods or services. While the
former could be immune to Constitutional scrutiny due to its unofficial, unenforce-
able, and non-binding nature, the latter would be immune to the extent that
Congress has not preempted such activities under its authority to regulate
interstate commerce.
1. Unofficial Arrangements
The use of Memoranda of Understanding and other unofficial, informal
arrangements have a long history in international relations, at least at the
nation-to-nation level, and governments worldwide use them for a variety of
purposes. 13 1 They are justified mostly because of their simplicity, lower public
profile, speed, and flexibility when compared to the formality and procedures
required of treaties. 13 2 In addition, there is growing evidence that in certain
national and transboundary contexts, an informal approach to managing environ-
mental issues may be more effective than binding accords for achieving coopera-
tion.133 The aforementioned MoU entered into between the public water utilities
of Judrez and El Paso is but one example on the Mexico-U.S. border.'3 4
Similar arrangements for local management of transboundary waters can be
129. See Evans, supra note 3, at 497-99.
130. Other variations include "Memorandum of Agreement," "Letter Agreement," or even oral or so-called
handshake agreements.
131. See Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments, 35 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 787, 788 (1986) (noting that "informal instruments are employed in almost every field of international
relations-diplomatic, defence, commercial, aid, transport. There is probably no area where they are not found.");
Charles Lipson, Why are Some International Agreements Informal, 45 INT'L ORG. 495, 495-96 (1991) (dis-
cussing the use and value of informal agreements for international monetary affairs and security relationships).
132. See Lipson, supra note 131, at 500-01, 514-23. Because informal arrangements place fewer demands on
the parties than their formal counterparts, they are far simpler and require less time to craft and achieve. As a
result, they also tend to be more accommodating of changing circumstances and are typically more easily
amendable. Finally, because of their informality and less-than-binding nature, they tend to be less controversial
and, hence, generate less scrutiny. See id.
133. See e.g., Ingo Heinz, Voluntary agreements as an instrument to solve conflicts between farmers and
water suppliers, in AGRICULTURAL EFFECTS ON GROUND AND SURFACE WATERS: RESEARCH AT THE EDGE OF
SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 11 (2002), available at http://itia.ntua.gr/hsj/redbooks/273/hysj_273-000.pdf#page=21
(describing a positive European experience with cooperative agreements between farmers and water suppliers
for reducing water pollution); see generally DAVID G. VICTOR, ET AL., THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1998).
134. See supra notes 106-108, and accompanying text.
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found on the Canada-U.S. border."' 5 For example, in 1996, the Department of
Ecology of the U.S. State of Washington and the Ministry of Environment, Lands
and Parks of the Canadian Province of British Columbia entered into a Memoran-
dum of Agreement (MoA) over the transboundary Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer.'3 6
Likewise, most small European transboundary aquifers are now managed success-
fully by local authorities under subnational transboundary arrangements.' 37
2. Contracts for Goods and Services
Contracts for goods and services are legally-binding agreements in which one
party agrees to provide to the other some product or service in exchange for
something of value (such as a fee). 1 38 In a cross-border context, this means that
the parties come from opposite sides of a border and supply or receive the good or
service across that border.13 9 Accordingly, in the example noted previously,
135. See Forest, supra note 101, at 755 (presenting research that "shows that close to a quarter of all twin
borderland communities are involved in water transfers, out of the 59 twin communities contacted").
136. See Memorandum of Agreement Related to Referral of Water Right Applications between the State of
Wash., Dep't of Ecology and the Province of B.C., Minister of Env't, Lands & Parks, Oct. 10, 1996, [hereinafter
1996 BC/WA MoA], available at http://internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Local-GW-
Agreements/1996-BC-WA-Water-Right-Referral-Agreement.pdf. Among other things, the MoA defines the
roles and responsibilities of the two parties and of their permitting agencies to allow timely prior consultation,
comment period, and exchange of information on water quantity allocations within each party's territory that
"could potentially significantly impact water quantity on the other side of the border." Id. Under the MoA's
umbrella, local stakeholders and industry groups have become very active in the coordination and management
of the aquifer. See Norman & Melious, supra note 102, at 202-203.
It is noteworthy that prior to the MoA, Washington's Department of Ecology and British Columbia's Ministry
of Environment, Lands and Parks had established an International Task Force for the Abbotsford Sumas Aquifer
whose aims were to: develop a joint ground water management plan; coordinate efforts aimed at protecting the
aquifer; develop aquifer management strategies using a managerial approach; and facilitate and coordinate
education and public involvement in water management issues. See Summary of Meeting of the B.C.-Wash.
Envtl. Cooperation Council, Oct. 1, 1992, available at http://www.env.gov.bc.calspd/ecc/docs/borderline-news/
meeting92.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
137. Jochen Sohnle, Transboundary Aquifers and Local Transfrontier Co-operation in Europe (Feb. 2006)
(unpublished report prepared for the UNILC Special Rapporteur, His Excellency, Ambassador Chusei Yamada
and the UNESCO Ground Water Experts Group) (on file with author). In the European context, local
management of these transboundary ground water resources is a function of both subsidiarity (see Huffman,
Vischer, and Carozza supra note 95), as well as the fact that the Eumpean Outline Convention on the
Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities authorizes subnational units to
enter into transboundary arrangements under certain circumstances. See European Outline Convention on the
Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, May 21, 1980), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html106.htm. The purpose of this treaty is to encourage and
facilitate trans-border cooperation between neighboring communities across an international boundary on
issues relevant to both sides, especially in the fields of "regional, urban and rural development, environmental
protection, the improvement of public facilities and services and mutual assistance in emergencies." See id. at
Preamble.
138. See E. ALLAN FARNswORm, CoNTRAcrs 3-9 (4th ed. 2004) (summarizing sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3).
139. The treatment of water as a good or commodity is a highly controversial issue internationally, especially
in the context of bulk water transfers and sales. See e.g. generally, Gregory F. Szydlowski, The Commoditiza-
tion of Water: A Look at Canadian Bulk Water Exports, the Texas Water Dispute and the Ongoing Battle Under
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certain businesses and private residences in Nogales, Sonora obtain their potable
water from the Nogales, Arizona public water authority through pipes crossing
the international border and each customer pays the provider individually.'4 0
Utilizing a different arrangement, residents of Derby Line, Vermont and Stan-
stead, Quebec obtain their potable water from a private company owned collec-
tively by the two municipalities. While a transboundary aquifer serves as the
source of the water, the wells are located in Stanstead, Quebec. 14 1 Interestingly,
Derby Line and Stanstead also have an arrangement by which wastewater from
both communities is treated on the Canadian side.14 2
D. PROCESS OVER SUBSTANCE
Given that each arrangement is envisioned to be locally-specific-tailored to
the unique geographic, hydrogeologic, climatic, and environmental idiosyncra-
sies of the local aquifer, responsive to local community concerns, and reflective
of the values of stakeholders on both sides of the border-any attempt to
formulate universal recommendations for a local approach would be difficult,
if not futile. Nevertheless, much can be said for suggestions that embrace
the multitude of possible dissimilarities and that offer guidelines for pursuing
cooperation rather than dictating criteria for success. One lesson to emphasize in
pursuit of a local approach is that the formulation of procedures can take
precedence over a determination of substantive rights.14 3
Determining states' substantive water rights represents one of the most
NAFTA for Control of Water Resources, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & Poi'Y 665 (2007) (considering whether
water is a good or commodity under international trade law and the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement);
Bryant Walker Smith, Water as a Public Good: The Status of Water Under the general Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 17 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 291 (2009) (arguing that water is not a "product" subject to the World
Trade Organization's General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Under U.S. law, however, water is regarded as
an article of commerce and, with some limitations, states are prohibited from restricting the interstate sale of
water. See generally Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); City of El Paso v. Reynolds,
563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983); City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
140. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
141. See PATRICK FOREST, A CENTURY OF SHARING WATER SUPPLIES BETWEEN CANADIAN AND AMERICAN
BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES, MUNK SCHooL BRIEFINGS No. 15, 19-20 (Oct. 2010), available at http://munk
school.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ForestSharingWaterSuppliesPOWI_201 0.pdf.
142. Id.
143. Cf. OSCAR SCHACHTER, SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES 69 (1977). Schachter asserts that:
It is reasonable ... that procedural requirements should be regarded as essential to the equitable
sharing of water resources. They have particular importance because of the breadth and flexibility of
the formulae for equitable use and appropriation. In the absence of hard and precise rules of
allocation, there is a relatively greater need for specifying requirements for advance notice,
consultation, and decision procedures.
Id. See also STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 480 (2d ed. 2007) (contending
that "The key to the maintenance over time of a regime of equitable utilization is regular communication ... this
simple practice, which usually occurs on the technical level, not only enables states to discharge their
obligations of equitable utilization, but also can be of assistance in the avoidance of disputes").
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complex aspects of achieving successful transboundary water cooperation.
While international water law does offer generic principles designed to guide
nations on how to allocate and manage transboundary waters,'4 ascertaining
what these entitlements might actually entail, especially in terms of water
allocations, is fraught with difficulties and can become an obstacle to cooperation
and the development of a transboundary water accord. 145 Difficulty arises
because states' rights are founded on notions of sovereignty, and any scenario that
asks a government to relinquish its rights, or even its claims of rights, to territory
can diminish that government's stature in the eyes of its populace and neigh-
bors. 14 6 Managing ground water can be especially controversial since states find
difficulty differentiating between the soil of their territory and the groundwater
flowing through that soil. 14 7
Cooperation over procedural conditions related to transboundary waters, on
the other hand, might be perceived as a lesser menace or a relatively minor threat
to sovereignty. Procedural cooperation tends only to impose obligations related to
information about shared waters rather than about ownership in and rights to
those waters. As a result, states with little information about their transboundary
aquifers, as well as those with a history of animosity or conditions disfavoring
water allocations, may be more apt to enter into water-related arrangements that
only require procedural obligations than to agree to arrangements that also
address substantive water rights. 14 8
144. For example, international water law provides that states are entitled to the equitable and reasonable
utilization of transboundary waters as well as the right not to suffer significant harm from the use of those waters
by other riparian and aquifer states. See Gabriel Eckstein, Managing Buried Treasures Across Frontiers: The
International law of Transboundary Aquifers, 36 WATER INT'L 573, 579-80 (2011) [hereinafter Eckstein,
Managing Buried Treasures].
145. An example in which negotiations over water rights hindered the development of cooperative water
arrangements is the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians over the Jordan River and Mountain Aquifer.
See Itay Fischhendler, Aaron T. Wolf, and Gabriel Eckstein, The Role of Creative Language in Addressing
Political Realities: Middle-Eastern Water Agreements, in SHARED BORDERS, SHARED WATERS: ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN AND COLORADo RIVER BASIN WATER CHALLENGES 63-65, 68-70 (2013).
146. In the mind of many politicians and governments, a nation's sovereignty, as the cornerstone of modern
state relations and international law, is sacrosanct and can never be undermined. Hence, a loss of sovereignty,
whether actual or perceived, is often a highly political and potentially destabilizing issue domestically as well as
internationally. This can be especially troublesome in regions of conflicts, such as the Middle East and South
Asia, but can also occur among cooperative nations where the subject matter-here, ground water resources-
may not be well understood. Gabriel Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Perspective of the Status of Ground Water
resources Under the UN Watercourse Convention, 30(3) COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 525, 528 (2005) (noting that "In
the past, legal professionals have described ground water as "secretive," "mysterious," and even "occult," thus
evidencing the gap in scientific understanding among jurists and practitioners").
It is noteworthy that this absolutist notion of state sovereignty, at least in the context of transboundary waters,
has been discounted and discarded. See McCAFFREY, supra note 143, at 112-126.
147. See McCAFFREY, supra note 143, at 485. While sovereignty clearly applies to the soil and land of a
nation, international water law limits sovereign rights to water flowing over the land or through a nation's soil.
Id. See also Eckstein, Managing Buried Treasures, supra note 144, at 577-79 (describing the evolving
customary international law limiting sovereignty rights to transboundary aquifers and their waters).
148. Two aquifer agreements that may have developed along this line of reasoning include the Programme
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Pursuing procedural cooperation in no way negates development of broader
aquifer-specific agreements that incorporate substantive rules of allocation and wa-
ter rights. Rather, it can serve as a first step in a gradual and sequential approach
to cooperation over transboundary water resources, especially where relations are
less than ideal, unique circumstances make allocation unlikely, or knowledge of
the particular water resource remains limited. As cooperation develops and as
trust between aquifer states grows, procedural cooperation efforts could form a
foundation upon which to enhance relations for eventual negotiations over
substantive water rights.
Among others, examples of procedural cooperation that could be incorporated
into many transboundary aquifer arrangements might include some or all of the
following.
1. Regular Exchanges of Data and Information
The regular exchange of data and information related to the character, use, and
functioning of a transboundary aquifer can be a relatively benign basis upon
which to build cooperation over the resource. Even in regions with minimal trust,
exchanging available material can help bridge misgivings and renew coopera-
tion.14 9 Such exchanges could encompass the transfer of existing information as
well as any newly developed data150 and could be structured in the context of
for the Development of a Regional Strategy for the Utilisation of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (NSAS)
-Terms of Reference For the Monitoring and Exchange of Groundwater Information of the Nubian Sandstone
Aquifer System (Oct. 5, 2000); and Establishment of a Consultation Mechanism for the Northwestern Sahara
Aquifer System (SASS) (2002), both available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/y5739e/y5739e05.htm.
149. Of course, where information is regarded as a security issue, such an exchange may become frustrated
as a result of one or more parties declining to exchange available data. Notwithstanding, Article 19 of the Draft
Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, which were formulated by the UN International Law Commission,
provides:
Data and information vital to national defence or security
Nothing in the present articles obliges a State to provide data or information vital to its national
defence or security. Nevertheless, that State shall cooperate in good faith with other States with a view
to providing as much information as possible under the circumstances.
Res. 63/124, supra note 81, at art. 19.
150. It is noteworthy that Article 8 of the Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, entitled Regular
exchange of data and information, provides:
1. Pursuant to article 7, aquifer States shall, on a regular basis, exchange readily available data and
information on the condition of their transboundary aquifers or aquifer systems, in particular of a
geological, hydrogeological, hydrological, meteorological and ecological nature and related to the
hydrochemistry of the aquifers or aquifer systems, as well as related forecasts.
2. Where knowledge about the nature and extent of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system is
inadequate, aquifer States concerned shall employ their best efforts to collect and generate more
complete data and information relating to such aquifer or aquifer system, taking into account current
practices and standards. They shall take such action individually or jointly and, where appropriate,
together with or through international organizations.
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regularly scheduled meetings, periodic conferences, and cooperation among
academics and research institutions, or on an ad hoc basis.151
2. Monitoring
The need to conduct continuous monitoring efforts on a transboundary aquifer
is a corollary to the regular exchange of data and information. Monitoring
effectively serves to extend and maintain those regular exchanges and provides
systematic checks on the particular transboundary aquifer's character, use, and
functioning. 15 2 Although focusing on projects implemented on transboundary
watercourses, the International Court of Justice in its recent decision in the Case
Concerning the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay asserted that "once operations
have started and, where necessary, throughout the life of the project, continuous
monitoring of its effects on the environment shall be undertaken." 15 3
3. If an aquifer State is requested by another aquifer State to provide data and information relating to
an aquifer or aquifer system that are not readily available, it shall employ its best efforts to comply
with the request. The requested State may condition its compliance upon payment by the requesting
State of the reasonable costs of collecting and, where appropriate, processing such data or
information.
4. Aquifer States shall, where appropriate, employ their best efforts to collect and process data and
information in a manner that facilitates their utilization by the other aquifer States to which such data
and information are communicated.
Res. 63/124, supra note 81, at art. 8.
151. See Eckstein, Managing Buried Treasures, supra note 144, at 577-78; Eckstein, Commentary, supra
note 84, at 578-79.
152. See Eckstein, Managing Buried Treasures, supra note 144, at 578. Article 13 on Monitoring of the Draft
Articles on Transboundary Aquifers provides:
1. Aquifer States shall monitor their transboundary aquifers or aquifer systems. They shall, wherever
possible, carry out these monitoring activities jointly with other aquifer States concerned and, where
appropriate, in collaboration with competent international organizations. Where monitoring activi-
ties cannot be carried out jointly, the aquifer States shall exchange the monitored data among
themselves.
2. Aquifer States shall use agreed or harmonized standards and methodology for monitoring their
transboundary aquifers or aquifer systems. They should identify key parameters that they will monitor
based on an agreed conceptual model of the aquifers or aquifer systems. These parameters should
include parameters on the condition of the aquifer or aquifer system as listed in article 8, paragraph
1, and also on the utilization of the aquifers or aquifer system.
Res. 63/124, supra note 81, at art. 13.
153. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Urm.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 18, para. 205 (Apr. 20). Former
Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, Judge Christopher Weeramantry, proposed that the duty to
monitor is better styled as a principle of continuing environmental impact assessment that can only be
accomplished through the regular exchange of data and information. See Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 88 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry). In that opinion, Judge
Weeramantry opined that "[a]s long as a project of some magnitude is in operation, [an environmental impact
assessment] must continue, for every such project can have unexpected consequences; and considerations of
prudence would point to the need for continuous monitoring." Id. at 111.
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3. Prior Notification of Planned Measures
Pursuit of a project with transboundary implications without alerting one's
cross-border neighbor of the plans or possible consequences can destroy trust
between border communities.15 4 Hence, a process requiring prior notification to
potentially affected aquifer states of planned measures that may have adverse
transboundary impacts could have a profoundly positive impact on cross-border
relations. Moreover, notice could encourage cooperation, especially when accom-
panied by available information on the project's potential transboundary impacts,
such that the receiving state could begin evaluating the situation, and the acting
state could make a commitment not to pursue the project during that evaluation
period. 155
4. Cross-border Public Participation
As noted previously, participation by local stakeholders, and the public in
general, improves the quality of decisions, facilitates the decision-making pro-
cess, improves credibility, and enhances implementation.1 57 The fact that an
international boundary segregates the various stakeholders should not be a bar to
154. While the infamous Trail Smelter case focused primarily on the transboundary harm caused by Tech
Cominco (a Canadian company operating in the city of Trail in British Columbia) to farms, orchards, and
residents of Washington State, it was understood that neither the company nor its host province or nation
provided Washington State or the United States with prior notice of their operations, which clearly had
detrimental transboundary consequences. The result was the arbitration in which Canada was found liable to
the United States for the actions of Tech Cominco. See generally Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada),
3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1941).
155. See Eckstein, Managing Buried Treasures, supra note 144, at 578-79. Article 15 of the Draft Articles on
Transboundary Aquifers, entitled Planned activities, provides:
1. When a State has reasonable grounds for believing that a particular planned activity in its
territory may affect a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system and thereby may have a significant
adverse effect upon another State, it shall, as far as practicable, assess the possible effects of such
activity.
2. Before a State implements or permits the implementation of planned activities which may affect a
transboundary aquifer or aquifer system and thereby may have a significant adverse effect upon
another State, it shall provide that State with timely notification thereof Such notification shall be
accompanied by available technical data and information, including any environmental impact
assessment, in order to enable the notified State to evaluate the possible effects of the planned
activities.
3. If the notifying and the notified States disagree on the possible effect of the planned activities, they
shall enter into consultations and, if necessary, negotiations with a view to arriving at an equitable
resolution of the situation. They may utilize an independent fact-finding body to make an impartial
assessment of the effect of the planned activities.
Res. 63/124, supra note 81, at art. 15.
156. See supra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
157. CARL BRUCH Er AL., From Theory to Practice: An Overview ofApproaches to Involving the Public in
International Watershed Management, in PUBLIc PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL FREsH-
WATER RESOURCEs 3, 6 (2005).
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their participation in the administration of an aquifer with cross-border implica-
tions. Hence, border communities overlaying a transboundary aquifer, as well as
stakeholders from both sides of the boundary, should be afforded the opportunity
to present their concerns and become involved in the decision-making process.'18
Such participation is especially critical at the planning and information evalua-
tion phases, as well as at all significant decision-making stages.
V. CONCLUSION
Ground water resources all along the Mexico-U.S. border are experiencing
significant stress from overexploitation, contamination, and mismanagement.
Worse, that scenario plays out on both sides of the border with little regard for
consequences. Imminently unsustainable, the situation portends the possible
downfall of the numerous border communities that rely on these transboundary
aquifers for their sustenance. While the circumstances continue to grow dire,
calls for a formal, border-wide solution have elicited little if any interest at the
respective national levels.
As a result of the inaction by both nations' governments, communities on the
Mexico-U.S. border have little choice but to take matters into their own capable
hands. In order for them to achieve viable and sustainable cross-border pacts that
will ensure the water futures of their people, economies, and environment, local
authorities must overcome the presumption that transboundary arrangements
exist within the exclusive domain of the federal authorities, learn to rely on their
own initiative and resourcefulness and pursue a course of action that will ensure
the sustainability of their local fresh water resources into the future, reach out
across the frontier to their cross-border neighbors and friends, and seek out
locally-relevant, collaborative solutions.
158. See Eckstein & Hardberger, supra note 91, at 119-20. An example in which a measure of cross-border
participation was incorporated into a subnational transboundary arrangement is the 1996 MoA between British
Columbia and Washington State over the Abbotsford Aquifer. That arrangement calls on the relevant permitting
agencies on either side of the border to provide a comment period to their counterparts before approving a
water quantity allocation. See 1996 BC/WA MoA, supra note 136, at 5; see also Eckstein & Hardberger, supra
note 91, at 117.
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